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3  Democracy’s Challenge: Nordic Minority Politics in 
the European Context
3.1  Democracy, the people and the paradox of sovereignty
‘The people’ is a ubiquitous category both in modern constitutionalism and in the 
rhetoric of democratic politics. When it comes to defining what democracy is in a 
nutshell, the formula of ‘government by the people’ is recurrently used. At first sight, 
this sounds reasonable enough: In a polity that is supposed to meet democratic 
standards, the subjects of rule must also have a decisive voice in the process of ruling. 
Yet the apparent common sense may well hide one of the most intractable problems of 
democratic theory and practice, as Robert Dahl (1989: 116) would put it. The problem 
concerns the very identity of ‘the people’: Which are the specific features a given 
collectivity of persons must have to be able to claim that they constitute a people? If 
the people are supposed to be the ultimate source of democratic legitimacy, who can 
legitimately establish who the people are? By raising these questions we approach 
one of the big ‘black hole’ areas of political sociology and political science. Modern 
theories of democracy implicitly assume that ‘a people’ exists. In the language of 
modern constitutions, the assumption typically becomes a programmatic declaration. 
But what are the social and political realities underneath the constitutional claims of 
‘government by the people’?
I suspect that much of the concern many scholars and public intellectuals 
express when they are confronted with issues of identity politics may be caused 
by the uncomfortable feeling of getting close to the ‘black hole’. An argument that 
can frequently be heard in this context is that instead of looking at our navels and 
discussing who we are we should rather focus on ‘proper problems’, i.e. problems 
that relate to the allocation of scarce resources. In contrast with this view, I will hold 
that defending an interest presupposes identity. After all, one of the main lessons to 
be drawn from the debate on multiculturalism and democracy of the last decades – a 
debate that seems far from being closed yet – is that democratic politics involves, by 
definition, identity politics. To ignore this would simply imply to keep one of the core 
domains of democratic rule insulated against the very logic of democracy. Here, the 
point not only lies in acknowledging the importance of input-oriented mechanisms 
of legitimation for democratic decision-making, as most political scientists would do. 
Input legitimation (Scharpf 1999: 6) is based on strong collective ties between the 
members of a community. These ties translate into a general consent which makes 
the outcome of an open political process acceptable to all community members. What 
identity politics now typically puts to the test are the very foundations of democratic 
input. For in many cases, raising identity issues means to question the legitimacy 
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of the established ‘self’ that underlies the exercise of democratic self-determination. 
In more general terms, examining the link between identity and self-determination 
forces us to take on a theme that, despite its high relevance, has for a long time been 
neglected by mainstream social science, namely the study of the making, reproducing 
and transforming of political peoplehood (Smith 2003: 10).1
Jacobinism has obviously had a major impact on the modern political imagery 
when it comes to the notion of people-making. On the one hand, Jacobinism can be 
understood as the main ideological force sustaining the French Revolution and the 
republican legacy. In this regard, its principal characteristic is the implantation of a 
political culture of generality, where generality stands for the representation of the 
general will by public authorities in a way that creates an immediate link between 
the identity of the citizens and the ‘grand national whole’ epitomized by the state 
(Rosanvallon 2004: 13). On the other hand, the Jacobin phenomenon can be associated 
with the political dynamics of modernity in a broader sense, which makes the 
French experience comparable to other cases: From the angle adopted by Eisenstadt 
(1999: 72), Jacobinism is seen as a ‘fundamentalism of modernity’. Accordingly, the 
main dividing line in modern politics would run between those who follow Jacobin 
orientations (be it with reactionary or with progressive intentions) and those attached 
to pluralist conceptions. From both perspectives, the tension between generality and 
particularity constitutes one of the central antinomies of modern democracy. Thus, 
what is at stake in the realm of identity politics ultimately is the very definition of 
what – or who – underlies the ‘generality’ that is to be democratically represented. 
Which identities can legitimately claim to be more general – and thereby democratic 
– than others? Who is who in democratic politics?
One can reasonably hold that the influence of Jacobinism on modern political 
thinking, which is still graspable today, when, for example, the virtues of ‘thick’ 
civic unity are praised against the dangers of multicultural fragmentation, is closely 
connected to the quasi mythical status that the French Revolution attained in the 
history of democracy and democratization. However, if we look at things more 
systematically, we may also assume that Jacobin views of democracy owe much of 
their enduring prominence to the possibility they offer for evading the ‘black hole’ 
which may emerge once we want to determine the identity of the people. In other 
words, the Jacobin approach offers an escape from the problems associated with what 
political theorists have called the ‘paradox of sovereignty’ or ‘Rousseau’s paradox’. 
What is the paradox about?
The concept of democratic sovereignty presupposes that there is a collective 
identity sustaining the polity which is conceived of as sovereign. Such an identity, 
1 There is a huge body of work on nationalism. Yet political peoplehood does not necessarily requi-
re a national form, although in historical reality the making of peoples frequently overlapped with 
nation-building.
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however, can itself hardly be conceived of as an outcome of democratic decision-
making. Democratic political structures do not emerge out of a historical vacuum, 
and the tribute we have to pay to history simply is that there is no democracy before 
democracy. To paraphrase the compelling observation made by Ivor Jennings (1956: 
56), government by the people can only take place after somebody has decided who 
the people are. The roots of popular sovereignty are inextricably connected with a 
past which is pre-democratic, so that the people – the demos – appear on the political 
scene without genuine democratic credentials.
Thus, as Rousseau pointed out, those who want to establish a democratic polity 
ultimately have to rely on resources which themselves lack democratic legitimacy.2 
Processes of establishing democratic rule have always involved inheriting a legacy 
made of asymmetries in the distribution of power. This legacy can only be tackled 
after democratic procedures have been introduced. In the moment of constituting a 
sovereign collective will, the people are on political grounds which are external to 
democracy. Now the Jacobin way of dealing with this situation and of circumventing 
the paradox of sovereignty has been to conflate the identity of the people with the 
identity of the state, constructing the ‘grand national whole’ Rosanvallon refers to in 
the French case. To cut a long and complex story short, the Jacobin approach consists 
in assuming that democratic sovereignty is ultimately embodied in the nation-state. 
The state represents an indivisible source of sovereignty, which is built on the uniform 
collective identity of the citizens.
The paradox of sovereignty thereby disappears to the extent that the Jacobin 
understanding of democracy converges with monist views of state power and 
citizenship: The nation-state becomes the ultimate source of political authority and 
the guarantor of uniform citizens’ rights within a discrete territory, while state-based 
patterns of identification constitute the fabric of legitimate political rule. Against 
this background, one can indeed argue that the French model of linking peoplehood 
and statehood served well into the twentieth century as the standard pattern for 
envisaging political integration under conditions of modernity (Kymlicka 2007: 42). 
The idea of national sovereignty made for a strong and unique bond between ‘the’ 
people and ‘their’ state. Nonetheless, the fusion of Jacobin and monist principles 
never remained uncontested, not even in France. On the one hand, the specific 
way peoples are to be linked to states, so that criteria of democracy and justice are 
sufficiently met, has been a persistent matter of intense political conflicts. Since the 
French Revolution, the problems that derive from the paradox of sovereignty have 
been reverberating in still ongoing controversies on how the collectivities entitled to 
self-determination should be appropriately defined and redefined. Symptomatically, 
2 The assessment can be found in Book II of The Social Contract (Section 7, ‘The Legislator’). The 
paradox may seem even more paradoxical if we take into account that it was laid out by a philosopher 
who was bound to become a major source of inspiration for the Jacobins.
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up to now the quest for democracy can be associated with a continuous proliferation 
of potentially and factually eligible ‘selves’. In the context of political development in 
Europe, it seems no coincidence that historical moments standing for a push towards 
democracy paved the way for the break-up of old, and the founding of new states. The 
wave of democratization at the end of World War I led to a significant increase of the 
number of European states. While one could count 28 of them around 1920, the figure 
had gone up to 39 around 1990, after the collapse of communism in the East. The more 
democracy, the higher the number of collective subjects who claim to have a right to 
self-determination, one may conclude. On the other hand, the basis of democratic 
sovereignty in a given political unit can be interpreted in pluralist ways, fostering the 
dispersion of power among groups and territories. 
However, the imagery of the one and indivisible generality encapsulated 
within clear-cut borders remains quite powerful, as becomes evident if we look at 
political maps of the world, whose single components, each with its specific colour, 
are ultimately meant to represent the blending of peoplehood and statehood in an 
environment of ‘United Nations’. The power visualized on these maps does not only 
have a symbolic character, but largely reflects the unequal access to resources used 
for defining collective identities in the politics of people-making. The dynamics of 
constructing the peoples who are to secure their claim on the political map thereby 
implies multiple forms of hegemonic categorization, as well as multiple attempts at 
overcoming its effects by articulating alternative identities. The political architecture 
of the people as the ‘grand national whole’ must rely on considerable institutional 
capacities to name collectivities, interpret histories and standardize languages. 
Power is required to strengthen the role of some collectivity, privilege its history and 
standardize its language at the expense of others. The application of the logic of 
Jacobinism to political integration entailed that the other was assimilated into the one 
and indivisible people under unequal terms. Thus, in the republican order established 
by Ataturk after the end of Ottoman rule, Kurds officially ceased to exist and were 
considered ‘mountain Turks’. Following the same kind of pattern seven decades later, 
the constitution of post-communist Bulgaria banned ethnic and confessional parties, 
trying to put a political veil on the presence of a substantial portion of Turks among 
its population. So there were officially no Kurds in Turkey, as there should officially 
be no Turks in Bulgaria, to make sure that the picture of the one uniform people is not 
threatened by those who it does not represent. In more extreme cases, the attempts at 
imposing a hegemonic pattern of peoplehood against diverse identities entailed the 
massive use of physical violence and led to the expulsion or even elimination of entire 
segments of a state’s original population. To depict the history of high modernity as 
a history of ethnic cleansing can therefore hardly be regarded as an exaggeration. 
That democracy has not always been a reliable safeguard against the prosecution of 
minorities in the name of the titular nations of modernizing states (Mann 2005) makes 
for a somewhat uncomfortable conclusion.
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Yet, it can't be denied that the fusion of national and democratic principles that 
both old and new states were eager to accomplish created a recurrent threat to the 
survival of minorities. The consolidation of nation-state sovereignty often led to the 
oppression of minorities for the sake of hegemonic integration. From the perspective 
of Europe's minorities, the legacy of the twentieth century is appalling. Even where 
state constitutions were supposed to guarantee minority protection, there was little 
official commitment to effectively implement the rights of minorities. In many cases, 
the de facto norm was anyway not to protect, but to get rid of minority groups, be it by 
assimilating them or by prompting their exodus. Accordingly, minorities can be seen 
both as the key witnesses and as the principal victims of the problematic character of 
the hegemonic link between democratic sovereignty and nation-state construction. 
As has been argued thus far, this is especially relevant if we wish to understand the 
manifold grievances members of ‘old’ minorities raise vis-à-vis the majority state. 
The labelling of groups such as the South Tyrolese, the Sámi or the Catalans as ‘old’ 
follows the intention of emphasizing their long and continuous presence in the areas 
they inhabit. Frequently, the groups in question were incorporated into the majority 
territory without their consent, and on that basis they often have a long historical 
record of struggles for attaining a sovereign or semi-sovereign status on their own 
grounds. Minority activism has certainly contributed to the erosion of the Jacobin 
paradigm of integration, which seems to have lost much of its former normative 
appeal all over Europe, as successive agreements on securing minority rights at the 
international level indicate. If we look at recent tendencies in international law and 
politics, what used to be the ‘French model’ nowadays rather looks like the ‘French 
exception’. Nevertheless, we should be cautious before announcing the decline of the 
once hegemonic approach to people-making.
While we may have witnessed some progress regarding the situation of minority 
groups of ‘endogenous’ origin in Western democracies, it is more difficult to make 
a general assessment concerning ‘new’ minorities, that is minorities constituted 
by groups with an immigrant background, who at present make for a substantial 
portion of Europe’s population. Concerning their status, it may be too hasty a move 
to maintain that there has been a general retreat from multiculturalism and a return 
to assimilation as the dominant approach in the liberal democracies of the West, as 
some observers have done (Brubaker 2003). However, over the last few years several 
Western European countries have indeed emphasized their intention to uphold well-
established majority identities before the cultural changes brought by immigration. 
Thus, admission to citizenship is made contingent upon passing tests which ultimately 
scrutinize the affinities an applicant has developed towards what one might call the 
host society’s ‘official image’. The controversies stirred by such measures are not 
caused because of their declared intention to foster the dynamics of civic integration 
in contexts marked by an increasing cultural heterogeneity, but by the re-affirmation 
of hegemonic patterns of people-making they apparently intend.
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3.2  The challenge of minorities
The concept of minority typically refers to groups who find themselves in a position of 
relative subordination in a given societal context, as they lack the structural capacity 
for generalizing key features of their group identity with regard to the dominant group. 
Sheer numerical inferiority may be the main reason for such a situation, but numbers 
tend to connect to other factors in manifold ways. At the same time, these other 
factors point to a cultural profile, based on ethnicity, religion or language, which is 
distinctive of the minority. Hence, in contrast to political minority options, which can 
potentially be adopted by an ever growing number of people and ultimately become 
majoritarian, attachments to a particular cultural identity tend to be of a more sticky 
kind, and less susceptible to deliberate choices. While all kinds of human civilization 
seem to have produced their minorities, the minority status gains particular salience 
with the formation of modern nation-states. This is so because of the great weight 
a shared cultural identity attains for political integration in the age of nationalism 
(Gellner 1997). By setting the standards that defined the identity of its citizens, the 
modern state tended to discard those identity patterns that were peripheral or even 
undesirable to the officialized self-understanding of the nation: Minorities are the 
product of institutional cultural politics. As I have argued previously, the logic of 
minority conflicts is inherent to the architecture of the nation-state. However, the 
conflicts and their outcome still reflect the contingency of politics. Accordingly, 
one must keep in mind that ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ are relational categories. The 
parameters characterizing this relation reflect the use of power, as well as the unequal 
access to power resources that different actors have (Kraus 1996: 370). How minorities 
interact with dominant groups, and how their position worsens or improves in this 
interaction, depends on political contexts which are subject to change. 
Notwithstanding the importance of contextual factors, there are a few general 
aspects that we may take into account to attain a better understanding of majority-
minority relations. One first aspect has already been mentioned: It is the distinction 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities. Old minorities are often also categorized as 
national minorities, in contrast with the ethnic minorities formed by immigrant 
groups (Kymlicka 1995: 11–15). In many respects, the central implication of drawing 
this distinction is to assign the claims of the respective type of minority a different 
normative status. National minorities want to maintain their specific group identity 
within a historical homeland, which they see as the basis for articulating claims for 
autonomy and justifying the objective of setting up solid institutional structures 
conducive to their collective empowerment. Ethnic minorities obviously lack such 
a homeland in the host country. In general, their claims do not primarily focus on 
preserving or re-establishing a particular institutional status, but rather aim at 
achieving their incorporation in the receiving society under conditions of equality.
The second aspect overlaps to some extent with the first one, as national minorities 
are in most cases territorially concentrated minorities. Territorial concentration works 
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in favour of minority mobilization and makes it easier to introduce provisions that 
give minorities extensive rights to self-government. On the other hand, it also has to 
be noted that disposing of an ‘own’ territory is a crucial asset for collectivities who 
want to accentuate their potential for institutional completeness before the majority 
state, thereby moving from autonomy towards independence. It is this constellation 
which can dramatically exacerbate the implications of the paradox of sovereignty by 
leading to a conflict over a minority’s right to secede.
A third aspect which may play a role in structuring the frame of ethno-national 
politics is whether a minority can rely on some type of external protection (Offe 1994: 
145). This is especially relevant in those cases where the protection comes from a 
neighbouring state that identifies ethnic kin-groups abroad as part of a larger national 
community, thereby fuelling conflicts over the legitimacy of territorial settlements in 
ethno-nationally mixed areas. The intertwining of intra-state and inter-state conflict 
dimensions may further complicate dealing with minority issues, as sovereignty has 
to be negotiated both between groups and between states. For a long time, and up to 
the present, dealing with the national question in Eastern Europe has been marked 
by this syndrome.
External protection, territoriality and nationality are variables delineating 
potentials that minority groups may use for their mobilization. Assessing such 
potentials will possibly help us to get a better understanding of the relatively strong 
position a group such as the already mentioned South Tyrolese has for putting 
forward its demands if we compare it to, say, members of the Kurdish diaspora 
spread across Western Europe. In one case, we have the typical example of a national 
minority concentrated in a borderland area. The support it received from the Austrian 
side after World War II was clearly functional for achieving ample autonomy rights 
vis-à-vis the Italian state. In the other case, the resources for exerting strong political 
pressure are basically lacking: Thus, activists trying to mobilize for the Kurdish cause 
in German cities, for example, do not receive any institutional support from the side of 
Turkey, where the bulk of Kurdish immigration to Germany stems from. As the Kurds 
in Germany lack political control over a homeland ‘of their own', German authorities 
are generally reluctant to classify them as an independent ethnic group, let alone to 
recognize them as a nationality.
However, to what extent potentials are activated follows no automatic logic, but is, 
again, a question of political contingency, as is exemplified by the case of the Swedish 
speaking Finns, who may well be considered a ‘strong' minority, although — if we leave 
aside the case of Åland — they lack both external protection and a clear-cut territorial 
basis. Neither have they been assigned nationality status. Hence, an assessment of 
the impact of ‘objective' resource potentials will not render an analysis of the deeper 
context of minority politics superfluous. It is this very context that we need to look at 
if we want to grasp the manifold ways power frames majority-minority relations. Still, 
regardless of the ultimately crucial significance of contextual factors, there are two 
major challenges of a general character involved in any attempt at tackling minority 
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issues under democratic conditions. They are intrinsically connected to our point of 
departure, namely the ‘black hole' in which sovereignty has to be constituted. Hence, 
both challenges relate to the problem of giving a satisfactory answer to the question 
of who the (legitimate) people are, although the question has to be confronted from 
different perspectives in each case.
The first challenge refers to the threat minority demands may represent for 
holding together nation-states as the key units for collective decision-making in the 
modern world. It can be called an ‘external’ challenge, since it results from the lack 
of legitimacy minorities attribute to the majority state for dealing with their affairs. 
As I have argued, most states have tried to prevent having to take up this challenge 
by striving for the cultural homogenization of their population, turning it into one 
people. From a present-day perspective, it seems out of question that the normative 
cost of linking the goal of democratic integration to assimilationist policies is 
excessively high, and that majority states have the obligation to respect the identity 
of minority cultures. It must also be acknowledged, however, that the problems the 
paradox of sovereignty bears when it comes to constituting a legitimate type of demos 
will hardly be addressed in appropriate ways by advocating an endless multiplication 
of minority-controlled political units. To put it in more figurative terms: We will not 
evade the darkness of the one black hole of sovereignty by simply creating a great 
many black holes. Thus, the external challenge ultimately begs the question of how to 
define a proper balance between unity and diversity. As has been argued here, neither 
negation nor homogenization is a justifiable response to diversity. Diversity requires 
accommodation. At the same time, accommodation will be difficult to achieve if 
the foundations of a common polity are persistently and vehemently questioned by 
minority groups. It also has to be said, though, that majorities are often inclined to 
conceive of accommodation as a one-sided exercise. The ‘other’ represented by the 
minority is then only recognized as some kind of appendix to the still dominant 
‘grand national whole’. Otherness is only tolerated as long as it can be kept outside 
the core areas of sovereignty, so that being a minority ultimately remains linked to 
a status of subordination, be it only in the literal sense of remaining exposed to the 
categorical authority of a superior unit. Accordingly, the standard approach to dealing 
with minority issues adopted in institutional contexts determined by nation-state 
prerogatives is based on a politics of unequal recognition, which assigns minorities a 
‘special status’, while it takes the majority identity for granted.
The second challenge concerns the way minorities represent and articulate 
themselves. In this sense, we might speak of an ‘internal’ challenge, which points at 
the very foundations of minority identities. The paradoxical character of the political 
dynamics of people-making becomes patent here as well, as the institutionalization 
of a minority identity often entails an ‘isomorphic’ reproduction of hegemonic 
standards. The spaces which are opened to enable minorities to develop a counter-
hegemonic discourse and challenge patterns of domination remain thereby subject to 
the very logic they supposedly question. At any rate, this is a criticism that minorities 
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in control of autonomous institutional realms are often exposed to: While pretending 
to defy the dominant group’s power of categorization, they would apply all too 
rigid categorization strategies when determining their own ‘self’. In a similar vein, 
minority institutions – political bodies, educational organs, cultural academies or 
minority-run media – are often portrayed in parodist ways, as if they were obsessively 
devoted to reproducing the dominant patterns of identity attribution on a minor 
scale. In consequence, minorities are often accused of being unable to transcend the 
essentialist politics they once had been themselves victims of. Minority groups are 
thus confronted with an expectation that representatives of dominant cultures rarely 
had to care about: to articulate their identities in a reflective and non-essentialist 
way.3 It is certainly justified to judge contemporary identity politics by other normative 
standards than those that were in place during the high time of nationalism. Yet, 
by doing so, one should also be careful not to incur in an unequal blaming, which 
is only the reverse side of unequal recognition. The practices of categorization we 
may find problematic in minority discourses respond to imperatives that continue 
occupying a central place in the language of modern politics and thereby push those 
involved in minority politics towards conceiving of identities as having an essential 
quality. Ultimately, the ‘nationalizing’ and ‘essentializing’ elements detectable in 
the mobilization rhetoric of an indigenous minority such as the Sámi must not be 
disconnected from the massive impact of Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian 
state policies when it comes to setting the terms of discursive exchange in majority-
minority relations in Europe’s far North.
Both the external and the internal challenge are inherent features of minority 
politics and have to be tackled in some form by disentangling the puzzles of sovereignty 
and disaggregating ‘the’ people into different yet complementary collectivities. Let 
me stress once again, however, how critically significant contextual factors are for 
getting an appropriate understanding of what is at stake in any specific minority 
mobilization. Only the sound analysis of context will allow us to grasp whether 
the identity claims of ethnic groups and nationalities work against or reinforce the 
hegemonic logic in the politics of people-making.
3.3  Minority politics in the Nordic context
Nordic countries are frequently described as being remarkably homogeneous by 
comparative European standards. This homogeneity is generally understood as an 
absence of pronounced cultural or religious differentiation. From such an angle, 
cultural homogeneity is considered a key background element for understanding the 
3 The critique of the essentializing view has been of central concern in the debate on the formation of 
social and cultural identities triggered by post-structuralism; see, for instance, Kristeva 1991.
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situation of minority groups in Northern Europe (Allardt 1981). In addition, the high 
level of cultural homogeneity would explain the low intensity of ethnic conflicts in 
contrast with other areas of Europe in the age of nationalism.
Moreover, cultural homogeneity can be interpreted as a factor which fostered the 
development of strong and wide-ranging welfare state structures in the Scandinavian 
region. Such a view is based on the observation that ethno-linguistic differentiation 
tends to have negative effects on the level of organisation of labour in a country. Low 
levels of labour organization in turn, tend to be negatively correlated with the volume 
of social spending (Stephens 1979). Against this background, the controversial 
assumption that cultural diversity is bad for social equality has been voiced in an 
upcoming and intensifying debate on the relationship between multiculturalism 
policies and the welfare state.4
The concept of homogeneity – of a historically entrenched homogeneity, one 
might want to add – seems to be a good starting point for assessing minority politics 
and the impact of immigration on established identities in the North. In this respect, 
I think that there are two aspects that are highly relevant for a critical reflection on 
the dominant approach to minority issues in the area. In the first place, we should 
be careful not to take homogeneity as something given, as the self-evident basis 
for the processes of social and political integration that sustained the blending of 
peoplehood in statehood in countries such as Sweden or Finland. We can certainly 
accept the argument that the early amalgamation of religious and political power 
structures brought about by the establishment of state churches made for a less 
arduous path to nation-building in the North than in the Continent’s South, marked 
by a long-lasting division of religious and secular authorities (Rokkan 1999). However, 
such an argument does not necessarily imply that Nordic diversity patterns smoothly 
dissolved in the process of nation-state construction. To use the powerful image 
of the folkhem, coined by Sweden’s Social Democrats: We should not assume that 
the people to be given their home were in the political picture from the beginning, 
happily waiting to get what they deserved as good citizens. Rather, these very 
people have to be conceived of to a substantial extent as a collectivity tailored by 
state institutions. Accordingly, what we perceive today as a strikingly high level of 
homogeneity would have to be seen as the product of a successful homogenization. 
To be sure, the historical rationale of homogenization varies from case to case. In 
Sweden, it may be linked to deliberate attempts by reformist state elites to create a 
thick bond between the citizens and ‘their’ polity, in a way that has some resemblance 
with the patterns of the French republican model. In Finland, it may rather be related 
to a particular combination of internal and external pressures in the political context 
of a young state in which social and political structures of a Nordic type overlapped 
4 The volume edited by Banting and Kymlicka (2006) contains a first critical assessment of this de-
bate.
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with an East European path to national revival (Alapuro 1988). I am clearly not 
pretending to offer any conclusive view of the dynamics of people-making in the 
North here. Nor is it my intention to replace the story of the folkhem with a narrative 
that focuses exclusively on the homogenizing thrust of integration. I simply want to 
emphasize that homogeneity should not be taken for granted as a historical given, 
but be related to shifting political constellations that make it more or less effective. 
One could look at the city of Helsinki, for instance, that some 100 years ago was a 
much more diverse place, characterized by minority experiences and intercultural 
exchanges of multiple kinds, than it is today.
The second aspect I would like to bring into focus when sketching out an 
approach to minority politics in the North is the thorny relationship between 
equality and homogeneity. The Nordic welfare state tradition has created robust 
links between national identity and social citizenship, links that found a compact 
expression in the Swedish concept of folkhemmet. Now, the key question in the 
context of our discussion here is to what extent the construction of the people’s 
home went hand in hand with the tendency to conceive of social equality in terms 
of cultural homogeneity. At the core of the idea of social citizenship is the notion 
that a minimum of protection and well-being is required to guarantee individual 
autonomy and enable men and women to make meaningful use of their civil and 
political rights. Since the comparative analysis of welfare regimes presented by 
Esping-Andersen (1990), it has become all but a commonplace in the social sciences 
that universalism is one of the most characteristic features of welfare policies in 
Scandinavia. At its most elementary level, this universalism implies that basic 
social entitlements have to be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their status 
or class. I have certainly no intention to question this noble perspective and the 
emphasis it places on the egalitarian dimension of citizenship. What we perhaps 
have to scrutinize more thoroughly, however, are the patterns of collective identity 
underneath the claims for universalism of the folkhem: Which kind of who is 
constitutive of the Scandinavian welfare universe? The Nordic welfare architecture 
is based on a strong commitment to achieving the social inclusion of all citizens. 
Such a commitment may involve a relatively hesitant public attitude towards 
admitting newcomers, as welfare states are still nation-states and as the universal 
entitlements they guarantee are controlled by national authorities, and meant to 
benefit nationals in the first place. For this reason, Jytte Klausen (1995: 246) takes 
a sceptical stance towards the ethos of universalism that is supposed to sustain 
social citizenship in Scandinavia: ‘It can in fact be argued that the Scandinavian 
welfare states are as much examples of closure and exclusion as they are examples 
of welfare state inclusion. Which feature predominates depends upon one’s vantage 
point, particularly whether one is a citizen or an alien.’
Klausen opens up an interesting angle of analysis, which deserves further 
elaboration. In this context, my assumption is that the limitation of universalism 
to those inside the folkhem may only be one part of the story, an important one, 
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to be sure. However, what seems even more relevant for the argumentation I have 
been sketching out on these pages is the possible trade-off between inclusion in 
the people’s home and the recognition of diversity. To what extent have universalist 
intentions been conflated with homogenizing practices? This is obviously a topic of 
crucial concern whenever we talk about minority politics. What ultimately is at stake 
in tackling it is whether cultural assimilation is the price we have to be prepared to 
pay to avoid social exclusion. For decades, the rhetoric of inclusion has been used 
to force indigenous peoples and minority groups to acquire a cognitive repertoire 
that conformed to the majority identity. Accordingly, the degree of inclusion of a 
citizen of Sámi or Roma origin in, say, Swedish society largely depended on his 
or her disposition to leave behind his or her culture of origin and become part of 
the presumedly universal community of industrial workers, small farmers and 
civil servants represented by the welfare state. In a similar way, the predominant 
approach to (political and social) citizenship — kansalaisuus – in Finland appears 
to be inextricably intermingled with an understanding of nationality – kansallisuus 
– with thick cultural connotations that makes it difficult to accept immigrants as 
equal as long as they remain different (Lepola 2000). Yet, if democratic citizenship 
is about equality as a means to empowerment and freedom, be it at the individual or 
at the collective level, there is no justifiable reason to interpret the concept of social 
inclusion in assimilationist terms. 
Thus, the many positive attributes that the nation-state has attained in the 
North as a guarantor of social cohesion might appear in a somewhat darker light 
due to a long-running tendency to conflate inclusion and assimilation. In Northern 
Europe, the civic republicanism of the French model was apparently enriched 
with important social elements, but this did not imply a rupture with the Jacobin 
approach to integration. Simplifying things, we could say that in the North the 
black hole of sovereignty was filled with the discourse on social welfare, but that 
addressing the paradox of sovereignty in this way did not substantially improve the 
fate of minorities exposed to the hegemonic logic of nation-state construction.
Let me end with an observation that brings together the two aspects which I have 
highlighted for the purpose of contextualizing minority politics and ethnic relations 
in the Nordic countries. The central role played by nation-state institutions in the 
field of securing social cohesion becomes patent even in those spaces that have 
successively been opened up during the last decades to recognize the existence 
of diverse identities under a common political roof. On the one hand, provisions 
that shall give different minority groups varying degrees of cultural autonomy 
are typically introduced and implemented following a top-down approach. The 
legitimacy that Sámi identity claims may have in Finland, to mention one concrete 
example, seems to depend by and large on how these claims adjust to the operation 
rules of Finnish public authorities. In a similar way, when looking at how public 
boards that shall promote the effective integration of immigrant groups in their 
local environments have been established in Nordic democracies, one may wonder 
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what the main priority is: Is it the due representation of newcomers, or is it possibly 
rather the preventive co-optation of minorities before they begin mobilizing 
themselves? If we want to take the challenge of minorities seriously, we need to 
develop criteria that allow us to distinguish between paternalizing and emancipatory 
forms of recognition. Furthermore, we have to be aware of the great risk that a politics 
of recognition orchestrated from above, regardless of all good intentions, just keeps 
applying the homogenizing logic, that structured the dominant national identity, to 
minority groups so that they conform to definitive standards that may be convenient 
to state bureaucracies, yet fail to meet the challenge of reconciling equality and 
diversity.
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